June 30 LLR License Renewal Deadline

SCR recommends that all licensees check their LLR license renewal requirements ASAP.
Visit the LLR website at the following link for more information -http://www.llr.state.sc.us/POL/REC/

SCR recommends that all Brokers-in-Charge check all associated licensee LLR license renewal requirements ASAP.
Visit the LLR website at the following link for more information – http://www.llr.state.sc.us/POL/REC/

Do not rely on the LLR A-K or L-Z “rule of thumb” because at least 700 of 35,000 licensees are not covered by that LLR rule of thumb.

• Renewing by June 30 2013 - You need 4 hours continuing education:  CEC aka Core aka federal laws update or any CEE (elective)
• Renewing by June 30 2014 - You need 8 hours continuing education:  4 hours CEC aka Core aka federal laws update plus any 4 hour CEE (elective)
• Salesman provisional to Permanent license - You need 30 hours post licensing course prior to expiration date on license and pay LLR $25 with form LLR240
• Salesman inactive to active - You need 8 hours continuing education (2 hours must be CEC Core federal laws update) and pay LLR $10 with form LLR210

Gladden v. Palmetto Home Inspection Services

Thomas and Vera Gladden appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Palmetto Home Inspection Services (Palmetto), alleging the limit of liability provision in a home inspection contract was unenforceable as violative of public policy and as unconscionable under the facts.  The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order in favor of Palmetto.  In the course of purchasing a home, Vera Gladden entered into a contract with Palmetto for a home inspection.  The contract contained a limit of liability clause, which limited Palmetto’s liability to the home inspection fee paid by the client.  After Mrs. Gladden contacted Palmetto about certain conditions in the home that were not included in the home inspection report, Palmetto returned the inspection fee.  The Gladdens brought action against the seller, real estate agents, and real estate companies involved in the transaction in addition to Palmetto.  As to Palmetto, the Gladdens alleged an action for breach of contract for failing to conduct the inspection in a thorough and workmanlike manner and to report defective conditions in the home.  The Court held that the contractual limitation of a home inspection’s liability does not violate SC public policy as expressed by the General Assembly and, as a matter of law, is not so oppressive that no reasonable person would make it and no fair and honest person would accept it.

Taylor v. Aiken County Assessor

D. Michael Taylor appealed the ALC’s finding that Taylor lacked standing to challenge the 2010 property appraisal and tax assessment for property he purchased on Sep. 7, 2010.  Taylor agued that he had standing despite not owning the property on Dec. 31, 2009, when the tax was levied.  The SC Court of Appeals agreed with Taylor and reversed the ALC’s decision.

Taylor purchased the real property located in Aiken County at a foreclosure sale.  He then immediately emailed the Aiken County Tax Assessor to “protest the appraised fair market value and resulting assessment of the referenced property for tax year 2010.”  In response, the Assessor reduced the property’s market value for 2011 tax year but did not reduce the market value or assessment for the 2010 tax year.  Taylor appealed to the Aiken County Board of Assessment Appeals but the Board denied the appeal because Taylor was not the property owner at the time the Assessor levied the 2010 tax.

Taylor then appealed to the ALC and the ALC found that Taylor lacked standing to appeal the property tax assessment for 2010 because he did not own the property as of Dec. 31, 2009, the date the 2010 tax was assessed.

The Court of Appeals agreed with Taylor that he had standing because he was a “property taxpayer” as defined by S.C. Code 12-37-610.  Taylor qualified as a property taxpayer as a person whose property is subject to the property tax.  Pursuant to section 12-49-10, unpaid property taxes become a lien upon the real property at the time when they are assessed.  Accordingly, Taylor’s interest in the property is subject to the 2010 tax by virtue of this lien.  The Court found the statute provides subsequent property owners, whose properties are “subject to… a property tax” by virtue of a tax lien, with the right to appeal their property’s valuation and resulting tax assessment.  Taylor had standing to appeal because he owned the property from the date of sale (Sep. 7, 2010) through the end of 2010 tax year.

The Court also added that the SC Revenue Procedure Act allows a property taxpayer to appeal the fair market value and assessment of property during a non-reassessment year.

Berry v. SCDEHC

The Court affirmed the circuit court’s order dismissing the Appellants’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Because the Appellants’ circuit court complaint only challenged the Enforcement Order issued by DHEC, and not the Revocation Order, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Law Court under the Administrative Procedures Act.  Pursuant to the APA, the Administrative Law Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the Appellants’ challenge of an administrative issue and the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Appellants’ claim.

Kiawah Development Partners, II v. SCDHEC — The S.C. Supreme Court affirmed an administrative law court’s (ALC) decision authorizing Kiawah Development Partners (KDP) to construct a bulkhead and revetment on Captain Sam’s Spit on Kiawah Island.  In 2008, KDP submitted an application to DHEC for a permit to construct a 2,783 ft bulkhead and 2,783 x 40 ft articulated concrete block revetment on the shoreline of the Kiawah River.  DHEC issued a conditional permit approving the construction of the erosion control structure for a distance of 270 ft but refused the permit request for the remaining 2,513 ft based on its concerns regarding cumulative negative impacts, including interference with natural inlet formation and possible adverse effects on wintering piping plovers.  DHEC also determined that the project was contrary to the policies set forth in the Coastal Zone Management Program.  KDP requested a final review conference by the DHEC Board but was declined; KDP then requested a hearing before the ALC challenging the denial of the construction of a bulkhead and revetment along the remaining 2,513 ft.  The Coastal Conservation League (CCL) also joined in the proceedings.  The ALC granted the permit to construct the bulkhead and revetment.  DHEC and CCL appealed and the Supreme Court reversed the ALC and remanded the issue in 2011.  The Supreme Court now withdraw its initial opinion, affirming the original decision of the ALC.  The Court concluded that the appellant’s argument regards the language and structure of the ALC’s order, and not in actual errors of law or absence of substantial evidence.  The ALC had acted within the permissible scope of its authority in modifying the existing permit.

Sapp v. Wheeler — In an action to collect rent obligations, the S.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s denial of Wheeler’s motion for a directed verdict on the claim for future damages, motion for a directed verdict based on the statute of limitations, request for a jury charge, and motion for a new trial.  The parties had entered into a lease agreement to rent a building so Wheeler’s company could operate a video gambling business.  The lease was from 1994-2014; however, Wheeler defaulted in its payments and was evicted in 2008.  He tried to argue that subsequent to the lease agreement, SC outlawed video gambling so the purpose for the lease could not be performed, and as a result, Wheeler was excused from performing its duties under the lease.  Despite these arguments, the trial court returned a verdict of $252,789 for Sapp and the Court of Appeals found that this was not inconsistent nor excessive.

Independence Nat”l Bank v. Buncombe Professional Park, LLC — In this mortgage dispute, the Court of Appeals reversed the master-in-equity’s decision and held that it erred in applying reformation and equitable subrogation as remedies.  The master erred in reforming the mortgage to alter the parties’ priority rights because reformation does not permit a court to write a new additional party into the mortgage to correct the error.  Equitable subrogation was also an improper remedy because Independence had actual notice of the prior mortgage.  The court reasoned that because that attorney authorized to conduct the closing was present, actual notice to that attorney of the prior mortgage was actual notice to Independence.

To read further about these cases and others on the advance sheets, click here.